Found 50 article(s) for author 'Rohini Pande'

Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City

Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City. Erica Field, Rohini Pande, January 2008, Paper: Religious conflict is an important problem in many ethnically diverse countries (Horowitz 1985). A growing literature in economics suggests that conflict over resources is frequently at the root of such violence (see, for instance, Este- ban and Ray 2007). A number of recent empirical papers provide evidence that negative economic shocks to a community, and the consequent struggle for control over resources, can help explain the eruption of historic tensions into acts of violence.” Link

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Repayment Frequency and Default in Micro-Finance: Evidence from India

Repayment Frequency and Default in Micro-Finance: Evidence from India, Erica Field, Rohini Pande, January 2008, Paper. “In stark contrast to bank debt contracts, most micro-finance con- tracts require that repayments start nearly immediately after loan disbursement and occur weekly thereafter. Even though economic theory suggests that a more flexible repayment schedule would benefit clients and potentially improve their repayment capacity, micro- finance practitioners argue that the fiscal discipline imposed by frequent repayment is critical to preventing loan default. In this paper we use data from a field experiment which randomized client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment schedule and find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client delinquency or default.” Link

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Profits and Politics: Coordinating Technology Adoption in Agriculture

Profits and Politics: Coordinating Technology Adoption in Agriculture, Rohini Pande, December 2007, Paper, “This paper examines the political economy of coordination in a simple two- sector model in which individuals’ choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization. We demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria; the econ- omy is either characterized by the use of a traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized technology and a high level of industrialization. Relative to the traditional technology, the mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off. We show that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility of Pareto-improving coordination by an elected policy-maker, even when we allow for income redistribution.” Link

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DAMS

DAMS. Rohini Pande, October 2007, Paper: “This paper studies the productivity and distributional effects of large irrigation dams in India. Our instrumental variable estimates exploit the fact that river gradient affects a district’s suit- ability for dams. In districts located downstream from a dam, agricultural production increases, and vulnerability to rainfall shocks declines. In contrast, agricultural production shows an in- significant increase in the district where the dam is located but its volatility increases. Rural poverty declines in downstream districts but increases in the district where the dam is built, suggesting that neither markets nor state institutions have alleviated the adverse distributional impacts of dam construction.” Link

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Political Economy of Panchayats in South India

Political Economy of Panchayats in South India. Rohini Pande, February 24, 2007, Paper. “Based on a study of some 500 villages in the four southern Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, this paper examines how the functioning of the panchayat system mandated by the 73rd amendment to the Constitution has had an impact on the economic status of villages and the households within them. The study finds that gram panchayats, created by this massive experiment in democratic decentralisation, have had an effect on the delivery of public services, for example…” Link

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Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?

Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria? Rohini Pande, January 2007, Paper, “Individuals’ inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual’s incomes from investment and non- investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government’s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government’s ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.” Link

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Large Dams in India

Large Dams in India. Rohini Pande, January 2007, Paper. “At independence, in 1947, there were fewer than 300 large dams in India. By the year 2000 the number had grown to over 4000, more than half of them built between 1971 and 1989. India ranks third in the world in dam building, after US and China. While some of these dams were built primarily for flood control, water supply, and hydroelectric power generation, the primary purpose of most Indian dams (96 percent) remains irrigation. In fact, large dam construction has been the main form of investment in irrigation undertaken by the Indian government…” Link

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Rural Credit

Rural Credit. Rohini Pande, January 2007, Paper. “In 2000, over seventy percent of India’s population, and roughly three quarters of its poor, lived in rural areas. The main livelihood in rural India remains agriculture, an activity characterized by significant time-lags in production and a high degree of sensitivity to weather conditions. These features of agricultural production make access to financial instruments critical to a rural household’s ability to smooth income shocks and make long-term productive investments. However, as is well known lenders’ inability to perfectly identify the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers and the cost of enforcing repayment places severe restrictions on rural households’ access to credit…” Link

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Institutions and Development: A View from Below

Institutions and Development: A View from Below. Rohini Pande, November 2006, Paper: “In this paper we argue the case for greater exploitation of synergies between research on specific institutions based on micro-data and the big questions posed by the institutions and growth literature. To date, the macroeconomic literature on institutions and growth has largely relied on cross-country regression evidence. This has provided compelling evidence for a causal link between a cluster of ‘good’ institutions and more rapid long run growth. However, an inability to disentangle the effects of specific institutional channels on growth or to understand the impact of institutional change on growth will limit further progress using a cross-country empirical strategy. We suggest two research programs based on micro-data that have significant potential. The first uses policy-induced variation in specific institutions within countries to understand how these institutions influence economic activity.Link

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Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South India

Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South India. Rohini Pande, January 2006, Paper: “We use household and village survey data from South India to examine who participates in village meetings called by elected local governments, and what effect these meetings have on beneficiary selection for welfare programs. Our main finding is that it is the more disadvantaged social groups who attend village meetings and that holding such meetings improves the targeting of resources towards the neediest groups.” Link

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