Found 50 article(s) for author 'Rohini Pande'

Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India.

Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India. Rohini Pande, October 2013, Paper. “Do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high-return but illiquid business opportunities among the poor? Using a field experiment, we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two-month grace period. The provision of a grace period increased short-run business investment and long-run profits but also default rates…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Choice Not Genes

Choice Not Genes – Probable Cause for the India-Africa Child Height Gap. Rohini Pande, August 24, 2013, Article. “In his article, “Does India Really Suffer from Worse Child Malnutrition Than Sub-Saharan Africa?”, Arvind Pana- gariya makes an impassioned case against accepting traditional measures that indi- cate that Indian children suffer from worse malnutrition than their African counter- parts. This phenomenon – that Indian chil- dren are more stunted despite the coun- try’s better performance on an array of other health and development indicators – was dubbed the ‘South Asian Enigma’ in an article by Ramalingaswami et al in 1996…” Link

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Roundtable on Development: poverty, corruption, fragmentation and conflict

Roundtable on Development: poverty, corruption, fragmentation and conflict. Rohini Pande, July 13, 2013, Audio. “The Barcelona GSE Summer Forum is a series of independent workshops and policy events that cover the main fields of Economics. The objective of the Summer Forum is to bring top researchers from around the globe to Barcelona to debate the present and future of the frontier of knowledge in Economics…”  Link 

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Women In Charge

Women In Charge Rohini Pande, June 2013, Opinion. “A policy experiment in India suggests that placing female leaders in positions of power can dramatically change public attitudes…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Women in Charge

Women in Charge. Rohini Pande, June 2013, Paper. In her opening address to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, Aung San Suu Kyi said: ‘There is an outmoded Burmese proverb still recited by men who wish to deny that women too can play a part in bringing necessary change and progress to their society: ‘The dawn rises only when the rooster crows.’ But Burmese people today are well aware of the scientific reasons behind the rising of dawn and the falling of dusk. And the intelligent rooster surely realizes that it is because dawn comes that it crows and not the other way round.’ The Conference resulted in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, compelling governments to enact legislation to include women at all levels of power and decision making, including parliaments…” Link

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Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India

Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India. Rohini Pande, May 2, 2013, Paper. “In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This paper reports on a two- year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically higher…” Link

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What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-party Auditors.

What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-party Auditors. Rohini Pande, May 2013, Paper. “We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India

Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India. Rohini Pande, 2013, Paper. “In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India

Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India, Rohini Pande, January 2013, Paper, “Do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high-return but illiquid business oppor- tunities among the poor? Using a field experiment, we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two-month grace period. The provision of a grace period increased short-run business investment and long-run profits but also default rates. The results, thus, indicate that debt contracts that require early re- payment discourage illiquid risky investment and thereby limit the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty.” Link

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Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India, Rohini Pande, December 19, 2012, Paper, What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local govern- ment in South-India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decision that have been delegated to local politicians – beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South-India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor’s village also obtains more public goods, rela- tive to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study. Link

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