Found 17 article(s) for author 'Risk'

A Measure of Risk Appetite for the Macroeconomy

A Measure of Risk Appetite for the Macroeconomy. Emil Siriwardane, Adi Sunderam, March 2018, Paper, “We document a strong and robust positive relationship between the one-year real rate and the contemporaneous valuation of volatile stocks, which we contend measures the economy’s risk appetite. Our novel proxy for risk appetite explains 41% of the variation in the real rate since 1970, while the valuation of the aggregate stock market explains just 1%. In addition, the real rate forecasts returns on volatile stocks, confirming our interpretation that changes in risk appetite drive the real rate. Increases in our measure of risk appetite are followed by a boom in investment and output.Link

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The Heightened Risks of a US Downturn

The Heightened Risks of a US Downturn. Martin Feldstein, January 26, 2018, Opinion, “The US economy has experienced nine recessions during the last 50 years. What makes the current situation unusual and more worrying than in the past is the low level of short-term interest rates and the high (and rising) level of federal debt, which will limit policymakers’ ability to provide the stimulus needed to counter a recession.Link

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Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly

Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly. Mark Roe, November 20, 2017, Paper, “At the root of recurring bank crises are deeply-implanted incentives for banks and their executives to take systemically excessive risk. Since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, regulators have sought to strengthen the financial system by requiring more capital (which can absorb losses from risk-taking) and less risk-taking, principally via command-and-control rules. Yet bankers’ baseline incentives for system-degrading risk-taking remain intact.Link

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Why Financial Markets Underestimate Risk

Why Financial Markets Underestimate Risk. Jeffrey Frankel, September 25, 2017, Opinion, “Today’s economy is in a “risk-on” period, when investors exchange safe-haven assets like US Treasury Bills for riskier ones, from real estate to carry-trade currencies. But when such behavior assumes that economic conditions are more stable than they are, as seems to be the case today, trouble inevitably follows.Link

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An Empirical Analysis of Investment Return Dispersion in Emerging Market Private Equity

An Empirical Analysis of Investment Return Dispersion in Emerging Market Private Equity. Josh Lerner, Fall 2017, Paper, “The authors use transaction-level data to compare the dispersion of private equity (PE) returns in emerging markets (EMs) to the same in developed markets (DMs). They regress within-market absolute deviation from the mean on an EM indicator and controls. They find evidence suggesting that the distribution of transaction-level TVPI has lower variance within EMs than within DMs, although with some caveats. The results suggest opportunities for further research exploring the relative riskiness of EM PE.Link

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Research: Hiring Chief Risk Officers Led Banks to Take on Even More Risk

Research: Hiring Chief Risk Officers Led Banks to Take on Even More Risk. Frank Dobbin, July 12, 2017, “Risk taking by big U.S. banks exploded in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, with disastrous consequences for American firms, markets, and households. Much of the added risk, of course, came in the form of complex, opaque financial instruments like derivatives, the “financial weapons of mass destruction” that played such a central role in the crisis and the panic that followed.Link

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The Hazards of Expert Control: Chief Risk Officers and Risky Derivatives

The Hazards of Expert Control: Chief Risk Officers and Risky Derivatives. Frank Dobbin, May 31, 2017, Paper, “At the turn of the century, regulators introduced policies to control bank risk-taking. Many banks appointed chief risk officers (CROs), yet bank holdings of new, complex, and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared. Why did banks expand use of new derivatives? We suggest that CROs encouraged the rise of new derivatives in two ways. First, we build on institutional arguments about the expert construction of compliance, suggesting that risk experts arrived with an agenda of maximizing risk-adjusted returns, which led them to favor the derivatives. Second, we build on moral licensing arguments to suggest that bank appointment of CROs induced “organizational licensing,” leading trading-desk managers to reduce policing of their own risky behavior.Link

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The Rise of Risky Derivatives: Chief Risk Officers, CEOs, and Fund Managers

The Rise of Risky Derivatives: Chief Risk Officers, CEOs, and Fund Managers. Frank Dobbin, November 18, 2016, Paper, “At turn of the century, regulators introduced policies to control bank risk-taking. Many banks appointed chief risk officers (CROs), yet bank holdings of new, complex and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared. Institutionalists suggest that firms respond to regulations by appointing compliance experts, who sometimes exaggerate legal requirements. We propose a more nuanced institutional theory of expert interests, and highlight effects of other powerful groups. Rather than overstating what the law required, risk experts sought to cement their role in shareholder-value management with compliance strategies that they also marketed as maximizing risk-adjusted returns.Link

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Have big banks gotten safer?

Have big banks gotten safer? Lawrence Summers, September 15, 2016, Paper, “Since the financial crisis, there have been major changes in the regulation of large financial institutions directed at reducing their risk. Measures of regulatory capital have substantially increased; leverage ratios have been reduced; and stress testing has sought to further assure safety by raising levels of capital and reducing risk taking. Standard financial theories would predict that such changes would lead to substantial declines in financial market measures of risk. For major institutions in the United States and around the world and midsized institutions in the United States, we test this proposition using information on stock price volatility, option-based estimates of future volatility, beta, credit default swaps, earnings-price ratios, and preferred stock yields.Link

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Does Aggregated Returns Disclosure Increase Portfolio Risk Taking?

Does Aggregated Returns Disclosure Increase Portfolio Risk Taking? David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, August 11, 2016, Paper, “Many experiments have found that participants take more investment risk if they see returns less frequently, see portfolio-level returns (rather than each individual asset’s returns), or see long-horizon (rather than one-year) historical return distributions. In contrast, we find that such information aggregation treatments do not affect total equity investment when we make the investment environment more realistic than in prior experiments. Previously documented aggregation effects are not robust to changes in the risky asset’s return distribution or the introduction of a multi-day delay between portfolio choice and return realization.Link

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