Found 726 article(s) for author 'Regulation'

Looking Back at Fifty Years of the Clean Air Act

Looking Back at Fifty Years of the Clean Air Act. Joseph Aldy, January 2020, Paper, “Since 1970, transportation, power generation, and manufacturing have dramatically transformed as air pollutant emissions have fallen significantly. To evaluate the causal impacts of the Clean Air Act on these changes, we synthesize and review retrospective analyses of air quality regulations. The geographic heterogeneity in regulatory stringency common to many regulations has important implications for emissions, public health, compliance costs, and employment. Cap-and-trade programs have delivered greater emission reductions at lower cost than conventional regulatory mandates, but policy practice has fallen short of the cost-effective ideal. Implementing regulations in imperfectly competitive markets have also influenced the Clean Air Act’s benefits and costs.Link

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The Dilemma of Gender Equality: How Labor Market Regulation Divides Women by Class

The Dilemma of Gender Equality: How Labor Market Regulation Divides Women by Class. Torben Iversen, 2019, Paper, “Women shoulder a heavier burden of family work than men in modern society, preventing them from matching male success in the external labor market. Limiting working hours is a plausible way to level the playing field by creating the possibility of less gendered roles for both sexes. But why then are heavily regulated European labor markets associated with a smaller share of women in top management positions compared with liberal market economies such as in the United States? We explain this puzzle with reference to the difficulty of ambitious women to signal their commitment to high-powered careers in regulated markets.Link

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Strategies for managing the privacy landscape

Strategies for managing the privacy landscape. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, 2019, Paper, “Firms use consumer personal information to improve their products and services. Personal information is open to misuse, however, and when exploited for undesired or unexpected purposes reduces consumer’s trust in the firm and their willingness to provide personal information. How should firms manage consumer privacy? We present a framework to help firms identify their privacy impact on consumers and respond appropriately. We argue that firms should consider the full spectrum of entities they interact with and which can exploit consumer personal information, which includes: the political environment (government), the security environment (hackers), the market environment (third party firms), and the social environment (peers). Firms should pursue strategies to maximize the privacy impact consumers derive across these domains, augmenting sources of positive impact and mitigating those that generate negative impact. Successful strategies for managing privacy combine four approaches: balanced cooperation with government, heightened security against hackers, limited disclosure to third party firms, and moderated propagation with peers.Link

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Carbon Tax Review and Updating: Institutionalizing an Act-Learn-Act Approach to U.S. Climate Policy

Carbon Tax Review and Updating: Institutionalizing an Act-Learn-Act Approach to U.S. Climate Policy. Joseph Aldy, 2019, Paper, “The design of climate change policy faces the challenge of several key uncertainties. First, the potential benefits of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are characterized by an array of uncertainties related to long-term economic growth, climate sensitivity, the effectiveness of emissions mitigation policy, and the climate risk mitigation actions undertaken through adaptation and geoengineering (Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon 2010; Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton 2013; Aldy 2015; Taylor 2015). Second, the potential costs of reducing emissions are characterized by uncertainties about the relative costs of low-carbon and carbon-intensive energy sources, technological innovation, consumer responsiveness to energy price changes, as well as the cost-effectiveness of policy design (Aldy et al. 2010). Third, the distributional consequences of climate change and climate policy responses are also characterized by uncertainty (Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009; Metcalf 2009; Rausch et al 2011; Carleton et al. 2018). Finally, the competitiveness impacts of emissions mitigation policy are uncertain and may vary with the relative stringency of policies around the world, transportation costs, and the energy intensity of manufacturing (Ederington, Levinson, and Minier 2005; Aldyand Pizer 2015; Aldy2017b).Link

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Predicting mid-life capital formation with preschool delay of gratification and life-course measures of self-regulation

Predicting mid-life capital formation with preschool delay of gratification and life-course measures of self-regulation. David Laibson, 2019, Paper, “How well do pre-school delay of gratification and life-course measures of self-regulation predict mid-life capital formation? We surveyed 113 participants of the 1967–1973 Bing pre-school studies on delay of gratification when they were in their…Link

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When waste pays: Inefficient (but seemingly fair) resource allocators receive social and economic rewards

When waste pays: Inefficient (but seemingly fair) resource allocators receive social and economic rewards. Christopher Robichaud, Jennifer Lerner, 2019, Paper, “The tension between equality and efficiency presents a cardinal trade-off in scarce resource allocation decisions. Three pre-registered experiments (N=1,095) and an independent replication (N=300) drew on the revised value pluralism model (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996) to predict how decision makers resolve such trade-offs. Studies 1-2 found that social observation by non-stakeholders increased allocators’ preferences for equal (yet inefficient) allocations – a finding that held even with real money and even when the efficient allocation made one party better off and no one worse off. Study 3 found that allocators who made inefficient choices received positive evaluations and monetary rewards from observers. Analyses also examined the boundary conditions for such benefits and the underlying mechanisms. Taken together, the results elucidate causal mechanisms for a fact of political life: Decision makers who make equal rather than efficient allocations can, by virtue of doing so, receive greater financial and social rewards from observers.Link

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Cash-for-information whistleblower programs: Cure or curse?

Cash-for-information whistleblower programs: Cure or curse? Aiyesha Dey, Jonas Heese, Gerardo Pérez-Cavazos, November 27, 2019, Paper, “We examine whistleblowers’ and firms’ behaviors under cash-for-information whistleblower programs using lawsuits filed under the False Claims Act. Within the sample of lawsuits filed with the regulator, whistleblowers report internally in only 50% of the cases before contacting regulators, and only 30% of the cases are settled, raising the concern that cash-for-information programs trigger many meritless allegations. However, whistleblowers are less likely to report internally when firms’ governance is weaker, and such firms are less likely to initiate internal investigations or refrain from retaliating against whistleblowers. Finally, whistleblowers seem adequately compensated under cash-for-information programs and do not face as severe career consequences as documented in prior research.Link

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Vulnerability, Compensation, and Support for Climate Policies

Vulnerability, Compensation, and Support for Climate Policies. Dustin Tingley, November 17, 2019, Paper, “Combating climate change requires large economic adjustments that will have significant distributional implications for countries around the world. Scholars and policymakers have increasingly proposed compensation policies to ease the costs of the “carbon transition” for vulnerable communities and create momentum for climate policy cooperation.  However, to date, little work exists to explicate the determinants of individual support for compensatory climate policy and particular modes of compensation over others. We argue that the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities to climate change events and economic adjustment to decarbonization generates distinct positions on compensatory climate policy designs. Employing new data from several original surveys in the US, we show that communities that are only exposed to the economic costs of implementing climate policy (namely, coal country communities) have more cohesive opinions in favor of compensation for workers vulnerable to decarbonization efforts than fossil fuel communities that are also exposed to climatic events. Both groups stand in contrast to the general population, which cares less about losing workers and more about alternate types of large-scale compensation. Importantly, we find that the strong opinions about compensation in the coal communities are closely connected to fears that climate policy may threaten their collective identity. Although greater recognition of climate policy compensation may improve governments’ responses to the climate crisis, our findings also point to the likely polarization that compensatory options can generate in relevant political constituencies.Link

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The Politics of M&A Antitrust

The Politics of M&A Antitrust. Suraj Srinivasan, November 5, 2019, Paper, “Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish causality, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm‐politician links and a falsification test. Additional findings suggest congressional members’ incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels: special interests, voter and constituent interests, and ideology. In aggregate, our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anti‐competitive mergers.Link

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