Found 11 article(s) for author 'methodology'

Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets. Scott Duke Kominers, August 21, 2019, Paper, “One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as the matching with slot-specific preferences framework.Link

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A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis

A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis. Scott Duke Kominers, June 26, 2019, Paper, “In game theory, we often use infinite models to represent “limit” settings, such as markets with a large number of agents or games with a long time horizon. Yet many game-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Here, we show how to extend key results from (finite) models of matching, games on graphs, and trading networks to infinite models by way of Logical Compactness, a core result from Propositional Logic. Using Compactness, we prove the existence of man-optimal stable matchings in infinite economies, as well as strategy-proofness of the man-optimal stable matching mechanism. We then use Compactness to eliminate the need for a finite start time in a dynamic matching model. Finally, we use Compactness to prove the existence of both Nash equilibria in infinite games on graphs and Walrasian equilibria in infinite trading networks.Link

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Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments

Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments. Eric Maskin, May 31, 2019, Paper, “The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of assuring the feasibility of a mechanism (game form), implementing in Nash equilibrium a given social choice rule abbreviated as (SCR) when the mechanism is constrained as to the way in which it is permitted to depend on endowments. A social choice rule is a correspondence specifying outcomes considered to be desirable in a given economy (environment). A mechanism is defined by (a) an outcome function and (b) a strategy domain prescribed for each player. Our outcome functions are not permitted to depend at all on the initial endowments. As to strategy domains, the with agent’s strategy domain Si is only permitted to depend on that agent’s endowment, but not on the endowments, other agents. (For earlier results concerning endowment manipulation, see Postlewaite (1979) and Sertel (1990).)Link

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Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal Choice. David Laibson, December 2018, Paper, “Intertemporal tradeoffs play a key role in many personal decisions and policy questions. We describe models of intertemporal choice, identify empirical regularities in choice, and pose new questions for research. The focus for intertemporal choice research is no longer whether the exponential discounted utility model is empirically accurate, but, instead, what models best explain the robust behavioral deviations we observe. We introduce the term “present-focused preferences” to describe the large class of models that prioritize present flows of experienced utility. Present-focused preferences need not coincide with a preference for commitment or dynamically inconsistent preferences. Present-bias is a special case of present-focused preferences.Link

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Choosing among regularized estimators in empirical economics

Choosing among regularized estimators in empirical economics. Maximilian Kasy, December 2, 2017, Paper, “Many applied settings in empirical economics involve simultaneous estimation of a large number of parameters. In particular, applied economists are often interested in estimating the effects of many-valued treatments (like teacher effects or location effects), treatment effects for many groups, and prediction models with many regressors. In these settings, methods that combine regularized estimation and data-driven choices of regularization parameters are useful to avoid over-fitting.Link

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Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1: Eleventh World Congress

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1: Eleventh World Congress. Ariel Pakes, October 2017, Book, “This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent research in economics. The book includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.Link

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Counting and Caring

Counting and Caring. Lawrence Summers, October 17, 2017, Paper, “The article presents the author’s views on economist Howard Raiffa who is known for his contributions to both decision sciences and negotiation analysis. Topics include the impact of Howard’s book “Decision Analysis” on the author in developing intellectual interests; and the role of his book in helping the author learn about Bayesian models and group decision making.Link

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Virtual, Visible, and Actionable: Data assemblages and the sightlines of justice

Virtual, Visible, and Actionable: Data assemblages and the sightlines of justice. Sheila Jasanoff, August 16, 2017, Paper, “This paper explores the politics of representing events in the world in the form of data points, data sets, or data associations. Data collection involves an act of seeing and recording something that was previously hidden and possibly unnamed. The incidences included in a data set are not random or unrelated but stand for coherent, classifiable phenomena in the world. Moreover, for data to have an impact on law and policy, such information must be seen as actionable, that is, the aggregated data must show people both something they can perceive and something that demands interrogation, explanation, or resolution. Actionable data problematize the taken-for-granted order of society by pointing to questions or imbalances that can be corrected or rectified, or simply better understood, through systematic compilations of occurrences, frequencies, distributions, or correlations.Link

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Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Causal Effects in Macroeconomics

Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Causal Effects in Macroeconomics. James Stock, June 8, 2017, Paper, “An exciting development in empirical macroeconometrics is the increasing use of external sources of as-if randomness to identify the dynamic causal effects of macroeconomic shocks. This approach – the use of external instruments – is the dynamic, macroeconometric counterpart of the highly successful strategy in microeconometrics of using external as-if randomness to provide instruments that identify causal effects. This lecture provides conditions on instruments and control variables under which external instrument methods produce valid inference on dynamic causal effects, that is, structural impulse response function; these conditions can help guide the search for valid instruments in applications.Link

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