Found 14 article(s) for author 'methodology'

Using prediction markets to predict the outcomes in DARPA’s Next Generation Social Science program

Using prediction markets to predict the outcomes in DARPA’s Next Generation Social Science program. Yiling Chen, 2020, Paper, “There is evidence that prediction markets are useful tools to aggregate information about researchers’ beliefs about scientific results including forecasting the outcome of replications. In this study, we use prediction markets to forecast the results of novel experimental designs that test established theories. We will set up prediction markets for hypotheses tested in DARPA’s Next Generation Social Science (NGS2) program. We will invite researchers to bet on whether 22 hypotheses will be supported or not. We define support as a test result in the same direction as the hypothesized, with a Bayes Factor of at least 10 (i.e. a likelihood of the observed data being consistent with the tested hypothesis that is at least 10 times greater compared to the null hypothesis). In addition to betting on this binary outcome, we will ask participants to bet on the expected effect size (in Cohen’s d) for each hypothesis. We recruit at least 50 participants that sign up to participate in these markets. Participants will also complete a survey on both the binary result and the effect size. Our goals are to elicit peer beliefs about the outcomes of the hypotheses tested in NGS2, and to test if these peer beliefs can predict the outcomes of novel experimental designs rather than replications. This study will increase our knowledge about the predictability of scientific results and the dynamics of hypothesis testing.Link

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Following Situation-Specific Social Expectations: Laboratory Evidence on Pro-Social Following

Following Situation-Specific Social Expectations: Laboratory Evidence on Pro-Social Following. Michael Hiscox, December 30, 2019, Paper, “We design an experiment where second-movers anonymously contribute to a charity after a first mover’s contribution, and provide evidence that whether and how subjects follow first-movers depends on situation-specific social expectations. Subjects who observe a first-mover and know an audience will see their anonymous contribution respond positively to what their first-mover contributes. Subjects who observe a first-mover but have no audience respond positively what first-movers are expected to contribute. Subjects who do not observe a first-mover respond to what is expected in their situation. The evidence is inconsistent with standard explanations of following, such as information transmission, image concerns, reciprocity, or cost structure. We conclude that subjects follow if it is expected of them, and what they follow depends on whether someone might be disappointed with the outcome.Link

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Rethinking economic development

Rethinking Economic Development. Nathan Nunn, November 6, 2019, Paper, “I provide a summary, reflection and assessment of the current state of economic development in both the policy and academic worlds. In terms of development policy, currently, the primary focus is on policy interventions, namely, foreign aid, aimed at fixing the “deficiencies” of developing countries. Academic research also has a similar focus, except with an emphasis in rigorous evaluation of interventions to estimate causal effects. A standard set of versatile quantitative tools is used, e.g., experimental and quasi‐experimental methods, which can be easily applied in a range of settings to estimate the causal effects of policies, which are typically presumed to be similar across contexts. In this article, I take a step back and ask whether the current practices are the best that we can do. Are foreign aid and policy interventions the best options we have for poverty alleviation? What else can be done? Is our current research strategy, characterized by rigorous but a lack of context‐specific analysis, the best method of analysis? Is there a role for other research methods, for a deeper understanding of the local context and for more collaboration with local scholars?Link

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Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets. Scott Duke Kominers, August 21, 2019, Paper, “One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as the matching with slot-specific preferences framework.Link

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A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis

A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis. Scott Duke Kominers, June 26, 2019, Paper, “In game theory, we often use infinite models to represent “limit” settings, such as markets with a large number of agents or games with a long time horizon. Yet many game-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Here, we show how to extend key results from (finite) models of matching, games on graphs, and trading networks to infinite models by way of Logical Compactness, a core result from Propositional Logic. Using Compactness, we prove the existence of man-optimal stable matchings in infinite economies, as well as strategy-proofness of the man-optimal stable matching mechanism. We then use Compactness to eliminate the need for a finite start time in a dynamic matching model. Finally, we use Compactness to prove the existence of both Nash equilibria in infinite games on graphs and Walrasian equilibria in infinite trading networks.Link

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Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments

Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments. Eric Maskin, May 31, 2019, Paper, “The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of assuring the feasibility of a mechanism (game form), implementing in Nash equilibrium a given social choice rule abbreviated as (SCR) when the mechanism is constrained as to the way in which it is permitted to depend on endowments. A social choice rule is a correspondence specifying outcomes considered to be desirable in a given economy (environment). A mechanism is defined by (a) an outcome function and (b) a strategy domain prescribed for each player. Our outcome functions are not permitted to depend at all on the initial endowments. As to strategy domains, the with agent’s strategy domain Si is only permitted to depend on that agent’s endowment, but not on the endowments, other agents. (For earlier results concerning endowment manipulation, see Postlewaite (1979) and Sertel (1990).)Link

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Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal Choice. David Laibson, December 2018, Paper, “Intertemporal tradeoffs play a key role in many personal decisions and policy questions. We describe models of intertemporal choice, identify empirical regularities in choice, and pose new questions for research. The focus for intertemporal choice research is no longer whether the exponential discounted utility model is empirically accurate, but, instead, what models best explain the robust behavioral deviations we observe. We introduce the term “present-focused preferences” to describe the large class of models that prioritize present flows of experienced utility. Present-focused preferences need not coincide with a preference for commitment or dynamically inconsistent preferences. Present-bias is a special case of present-focused preferences.Link

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Choosing among regularized estimators in empirical economics

Choosing among regularized estimators in empirical economics. Maximilian Kasy, December 2, 2017, Paper, “Many applied settings in empirical economics involve simultaneous estimation of a large number of parameters. In particular, applied economists are often interested in estimating the effects of many-valued treatments (like teacher effects or location effects), treatment effects for many groups, and prediction models with many regressors. In these settings, methods that combine regularized estimation and data-driven choices of regularization parameters are useful to avoid over-fitting.Link

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Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1: Eleventh World Congress

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1: Eleventh World Congress. Ariel Pakes, October 2017, Book, “This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent research in economics. The book includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.Link

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Counting and Caring

Counting and Caring. Lawrence Summers, October 17, 2017, Paper, “The article presents the author’s views on economist Howard Raiffa who is known for his contributions to both decision sciences and negotiation analysis. Topics include the impact of Howard’s book “Decision Analysis” on the author in developing intellectual interests; and the role of his book in helping the author learn about Bayesian models and group decision making.Link

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