Found 9 article(s) for author 'John Coates'

Stock Market Distress Signal: How Low-Cost Index Funds Are Taking Over

Stock Market Distress Signal: How Low-Cost Index Funds Are Taking Over. John Coates, December 12, 2018, “Sounding the alarm on index funds. How their runaway success has reshaped power and accountability in boardrooms and on Wall Street. Guests – John Coates, professor of law and economics at Harvard Law School where he teaches corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions and finance. Member of the Investor Advisory Committee of the Securities and Exchanges Commission. (@jciv) Link

 

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GE Capital after the Crisis

GE Capital after the Crisis. John Coates, John Dionne, David S. Scharfstein, April 2017, Case, “Keith Sherin, CEO of GE Capital, faced a decision on which hinged billions of dollars and the fate of one of America’s most storied companies. On his desk sat two secret analyses: Project Beacon, a proposal to spin off most of GE Capital to GE shareholders, and Project Hubble, a proposal to sell off GE Capital in parts. A third document sketched out the implications should GE “stay the course” on its present strategy: a continued, massive build-up of regulatory and compliance personnel to meet GE Capital’s obligations as a “SIFI”—systemically important financial institution—in the wake of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.Link

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Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals

Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals. John Coates, October 26, 2016, Paper, “Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size – from 35 to 88 singlespaced pages in this paper’s font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity – from post-graduate “grade 20” to post-doctoral “grade 30”. A substantial portion (lower bound ~20%) of the growth consists not of mere verbiage but of substantive new terms. These include rational reactions to new legal risks (e.g., SOX, FCPA enforcement, shareholder litigation) as well as to changes in deal and financing markets (e.g., financing conditions, financing covenants, and cooperation covenants; and reverse termination fees).Link

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Quantifying Foreign Institutional Block Ownership at Publicly Traded U.S. Corporations

Quantifying Foreign Institutional Block Ownership at Publicly Traded U.S. Corporations. John Coates, October 2016, Paper, “This short technical report provides an empirical analysis of the level of foreign institutional block ownership at a broad set of publicly traded corporations. Disclosed institutional blockholders of every company in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index are analyzed to determine if these blockholders were foreign entities or were majority owned or controlled by foreign entities. Roughly one in eleven (9%) companies in the S&P 500 has one or more foreign institutions each owning five percent or more blocks of stock, nine have foreign institutions with ten percent or more blocks, five have a foreign institution with more than fifteen percent, and three have foreign institutions with more than 20% blocks.Link

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The Volcker Rule as structural law: implications for cost-benefit analysis and administrative law

The Volcker Rule as structural law: implications for cost-benefit analysis and administrative law. John Coates, 2016, Paper. “The Volcker rule, a key part of Congress’s response to the financial crisis, is best understood as a “structural law,” a traditional Anglo-American technique for governance of hybrid public-private institutions such as banks and central banks. The tradition extends much farther back in time than the Glass-Steagall Act, to which the Volcker Rule has been unfavorably (but unfairly) compared. The goals of the Volcker Rule are complex and ambitious, and not limited to reducing risk directly, but include reshaping banks’ organizational cultures. Another body of structural laws, part of the core of administrative law, attempts to restrain and discipline regulatory agencies, through process requirements such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Could the Volcker rule be the subject of reliable, precise, quantified CBA? Given the nature of the Volcker rule as structural law, its ambitions, and the current capacities of CBA, the answer is clearly “no,” as it would require regulators to anticipate, in advance of data, private market behavior in response to novel activity constraints.Link

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Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications

Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications. John Coates, February 27, 2015, Paper. “This Article draws on empirical analysis, history, and economic theory to show that corporations have begun to displace individuals as direct beneficiaries of the First Amendment and to outline an argument that the shift reflects economically harmful rent seeking. The history of corporations, regulation of commercial speech, and First Amendment case law is retold, with an emphasis on the role of constitutional entrepreneur Justice Lewis Powell, who prompted the Supreme Court to invent corporate and commercial speech rights…Link

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Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory Management

Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory Management. John Coates, July 14, 2014, Paper. “Cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation (CBA/FR) has become a flashpoint in contemporary legal and political debates, partly due to the Dodd-Frank Act. Yet debates over CBA/FR exhibit terminological confusion, and CBA/FR advocacy has outrun the possible, given data limitations and current research techniques, and has neglected institutional and legal design, relying unreflectively on the dubious idea of judicially enforced quantification in a conventional administrative law framework. The aim of this paper is to take up…Link

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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications. John Coates, January 6, 2014, Paper. “Some members of Congress, the D.C. Circuit, and legal academia are promoting a particular, abstract form of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation: judicially enforced quantification. How would CBA work in practice, if applied to specific, important, representative rules, and what is the alternative? Detailed case studies of six rules – (1) disclosure rules under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, (2) the SEC’s mutual fund governance reforms, (3) Basel III’s heightened capital requirements for banks, (4) the Volcker…” Linkverified March 28, 2014

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SEC’s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy and Political Mistake

SEC’s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy and Political Mistake. John Coates, December 13, 2013, Opinion. “The SEC’s recent decision to take disclosure of political activities off the SEC’s agenda is a policy mistake, as it ignores the best research on the point, described below, and perpetuates a key loophole in the investor-relevant disclosure rules, allowing large companies to omit material information about the politically inflected risks they run with other people’s money. It is also a political mistake, as it repudiates the 600,000+ investors who have written to the SEC personally to ask it to adopt a rule requiring…Link verified March 28, 2014

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