Found 11 article(s) for author 'Dustin Tingley'

Vulnerability, Compensation, and Support for Climate Policies

Vulnerability, Compensation, and Support for Climate Policies. Dustin Tingley, November 17, 2019, Paper, “Combating climate change requires large economic adjustments that will have significant distributional implications for countries around the world. Scholars and policymakers have increasingly proposed compensation policies to ease the costs of the “carbon transition” for vulnerable communities and create momentum for climate policy cooperation.  However, to date, little work exists to explicate the determinants of individual support for compensatory climate policy and particular modes of compensation over others. We argue that the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities to climate change events and economic adjustment to decarbonization generates distinct positions on compensatory climate policy designs. Employing new data from several original surveys in the US, we show that communities that are only exposed to the economic costs of implementing climate policy (namely, coal country communities) have more cohesive opinions in favor of compensation for workers vulnerable to decarbonization efforts than fossil fuel communities that are also exposed to climatic events. Both groups stand in contrast to the general population, which cares less about losing workers and more about alternate types of large-scale compensation. Importantly, we find that the strong opinions about compensation in the coal communities are closely connected to fears that climate policy may threaten their collective identity. Although greater recognition of climate policy compensation may improve governments’ responses to the climate crisis, our findings also point to the likely polarization that compensatory options can generate in relevant political constituencies.Link

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Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining. Dustin Tingley, 2019, Paper, “International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.Link

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International Commitments and Domestic Opinion: The Effect of the Paris Agreement on Public Support for Policies to Address Climate Change

International Commitments and Domestic Opinion: The Effect of the Paris Agreement on Public Support for Policies to Address Climate Change. Dustin Tingley, January 2019, Paper, “The Paris Agreement marked a new turn in international environmental agreements, by allowing each country to set its own non-binding goals for emissions reductions. How might purely voluntary international commitments affect domestic support for costly policies to address climate change? We investigated this question by administering survey experiments in the U.S. Our experiments supported three conclusions. First, even voluntary international commitments transformed public opinion. Public support emissions control policies was much higher in scenarios where the U.S. government had joined the Paris Agreement than in scenarios where it had not. Second, voluntary commitments were most consequential in boosting support for policies that imposed intermediate costs on the public, while having smaller effects on policies involving low or high costs. Finally, our experiments exposed the dangers of promising too much (overpledging) or too little (underpledging). These findings have important implications for the design and consequences of international agreements.Link

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Firms and Global Value Chains: Identifying Firms’ Multidimensional Trade Preferences

Firms and Global Value Chains: Identifying Firms’ Multidimensional Trade Preferences. Dustin Tingley, April 16, 2018, “Trade policy has become increasingly multidimensional. Current trade agreements not only address market access but also encompass rules and provisions related to flexibility of commitment, investment protection, and dispute settlement mechanisms. Yet, rigorous evidence about how interest groups evaluate each policy measure in relation to others remains scarce. We develop a firm-level theoretical framework to explain how firms’ international operations affect their preferences on different trade policy measures. We experimentally evaluate preferences over multiple policy dimensions using a conjoint analysis on firms in Costa Rica.Link

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Conceptual and Historical Foundations of Foreign Aid

Conceptual and Historical Foundations of Foreign Aid. Dustin Tingley, April 2017, Paper, “Foreign aid is a policy instrument of limited budgetary scope that nonetheless generates highly contentious debate. Yet while the contemporary scholarly literature almost exclusively considers aid in the post-World War II era, we argue that also considering aid in earlier periods of history helps to better understand the broader politics of foreign aid. Neglect of this deeper history of foreign aid specifically produces three misconceptions: that foreign aid is a uniquely modern policy instrument, that foreign aid is relatively homogenous in donor intent, and that foreign aid’s scope is primarily limited to the contemporary humanitarian interventions upon which the bulk of scholarly analysis is centered.Link

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The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy

The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy. Dustin Tingley, January 2017, Paper, “What factors determine firms’ attitudes toward trade policy? This paper considers producers’ policy preferences and political behavior in light of two key patterns in modern international trade: industries that face import competition often have many exporters, and foreign sales are concentrated in the hands of a small number of “superstar” exporters. Using a new survey of Costa Rican firms matched to systematic firm-level data on export behavior, we find that firm features are generally more important predictors of attitudes toward trade liberalization than industry-wide comparative advantage. We also show that export intensity is strongly associated with interest and lobbying activity on trade policy. The largest exporters, who are the strongest supporters of global integration, dominate trade politics.Link

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Firms’ Preferences over Multidimensional Trade Policies: Global Production Chains, Investment Protection and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

Firms’ Preferences over Multidimensional Trade Policies: Global Production Chains, Investment Protection and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms. Dustin Tingley, April 16, 2016, Paper. “In addition to the conventional focus on market access, recent trade agreements have included investment protection, dispute settlement mechanisms, and escape clauses that enhance flexibility. We argue that preferences over these newly salient dimensions of trade policy will vary by firm, not by industry, and that a firm’s preferences will depend on its insertion into global production networks. To estimate a firm’s preferences over multiple policy dimensions, we conduct a conjoint experiment on firms in Costa Rica, a middle-income democracy in the developing world. We find that investment protection is the most salient trade policy dimension for firms who are most deeply integrated into global production networks. In addition, strong dispute settlement procedures are most valued by exporters who are not central to global supply networks. Furthermore, we find few differences across industries, thus challenging the conventional focus on inter-industry distinctions in the trade policy literature.Link

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Distributional Equity in Climate Change Policy: Responsibility, Capacity, and Vulnerability

Distributional Equity in Climate Change Policy: Responsibility, Capacity, and Vulnerability. Dustin Tingley, February 3, 2016, Paper. “Bargaining over the allocation of costs to curb the effects of climate change has proven difficult, as evidenced by repeated failures to reach an international agreement. Sadly, the longer it takes to produce an agreement, the more likely it is that climate change will impose significant costs on all countries. We argue that a successful agreement will allocate costs to countries based on three dimensions of distributional equity: their capacity to pay to curb the effects of climate change, their vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change, and their responsibility for causing climate change.Link

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The Political Economy of Inward FDI: Opposition to Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions

The Political Economy of Inward FDI: Opposition to Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions, Dustin Tingley, January 19, 2015, Paper, A great deal of political economy scholarship has focused on how countries can attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the effects of FDI on growth and political stability. A related topic that has received almost no attention, however, is that of divergent political reactions to inflows of FDI in the countries receiving investments. This is an oversight, because inward FDI flows are not equally welcomed by the host country and, in fact, often encounter strong political opposition. We study this phenomenon by examining political opposition to attempts by Chinese companies at mergers and acquisitions (M&As) with US firmsLink


Trade Policy, Economic Interests and Party Politics in a Developing Country: The Political Economy of CAFTA-DR

Trade Policy, Economic Interests and Party Politics in a Developing Country: The Political Economy of CAFTA-DR. Dustin Tingley, 2014, Paper. “Developing countries have increasingly opened their economies to trade. Research about trade policy in developed countries focuses on a bottom-up process by identifying economic preferences of domestic groups. We know less about developing countries. We analyze how economic and political variables influenced Costa Rican voters in a referendum on CAFTA-DR, an international trade agreement. We find little support for…” Link verified October 8, 2014

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