Found 24 article(s) for author 'Climate Change'

The Best Tool to Fight Climate Change

The Best Tool to Fight Climate Change. Jeffrey Frankel, January 20, 2020, Opinion, “If they are serious about tackling climate change, governments must quickly establish the expectation that the price of carbon will follow a generally rising path in the future. Lofty statements from public officials and optimal calculations from climate modelers will not do the job.Link

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Vulnerability, Compensation, and Support for Climate Policies

Vulnerability, Compensation, and Support for Climate Policies. Dustin Tingley, November 17, 2019, Paper, “Combating climate change requires large economic adjustments that will have significant distributional implications for countries around the world. Scholars and policymakers have increasingly proposed compensation policies to ease the costs of the “carbon transition” for vulnerable communities and create momentum for climate policy cooperation.  However, to date, little work exists to explicate the determinants of individual support for compensatory climate policy and particular modes of compensation over others. We argue that the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities to climate change events and economic adjustment to decarbonization generates distinct positions on compensatory climate policy designs. Employing new data from several original surveys in the US, we show that communities that are only exposed to the economic costs of implementing climate policy (namely, coal country communities) have more cohesive opinions in favor of compensation for workers vulnerable to decarbonization efforts than fossil fuel communities that are also exposed to climatic events. Both groups stand in contrast to the general population, which cares less about losing workers and more about alternate types of large-scale compensation. Importantly, we find that the strong opinions about compensation in the coal communities are closely connected to fears that climate policy may threaten their collective identity. Although greater recognition of climate policy compensation may improve governments’ responses to the climate crisis, our findings also point to the likely polarization that compensatory options can generate in relevant political constituencies.Link

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Shareholder Activism and Firms’ Voluntary Disclosure of Climate Change Risk

Shareholder Activism and Firms’ Voluntary Disclosure of Climate Change Risk. Michael Toffel, October 2019, Paper, “This paper examines whether—in the absence of mandated disclosure requirements—shareholder activism can elicit greater disclosure of firms’ exposure to climate change risks. We find that environmental shareholder activism increases the voluntary disclosure of climate change risks, especially if initiated by investors who are more powerful (institutional investors) or whose request has more legitimacy (long-term institutional investors). We also find that companies that voluntarily disclose climate change risks following environmental shareholder activism achieve a higher valuation, suggesting that investors value transparency with respect to climate change risks.Link

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Reviewing the Climate Crisis Town Hall

Reviewing the Climate Crisis Town Hall. Joseph Aldy, September 8, 2019, Audio, “Host Steve Curwood sits down with Joe Aldy, economist and Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, to take a look at carbon pricing, a just transition for fossil fuel workers, and other key topics from the climate crisis town hall.Link

 

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Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining. Dustin Tingley, 2019, Paper, “International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.Link

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William Hogan on Electricity Markets, Solutions for Climate Change, and Carbon Tax Policy

William Hogan on Electricity Markets, Solutions for Climate Change, and Carbon Tax Policy August 2019. GrowthPolicy’s Devjani Roy interviewed William Hogan, Raymond Plank Research Professor of Global Energy Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and Research Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, on electricity markets, climate change, and carbon tax policy. | Click here for […]

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Climate Change, Climate Policy, and Economic Growth

Climate Change, Climate Policy, and Economic Growth. James Stock, July 1, 2019, Paper, “The topics of climate change and climate change policy encompass a complex mixture of the natural sciences, economics, and a mass of institutional, legal, and technical details. This complexity and multidisciplinary nature make it difficult for thoughtful citizens to reach their own conclusions on the topic and for potentially interested economists to know where to start. This essay aims to provide a point of entry for macroeconomists interested in climate change and climate change policy but with no special knowledge of the field. I therefore start at the beginning, with some basic background on climate change, presented through the eyes of an econometrician. I then turn to climate policy in the United States. That discussion points to a large number of researchable open questions which macroeconomists are particularly well-suited to tackle.Link

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3 Ways Investors Can Pressure Companies to Take Sustainability Seriously

3 Ways Investors Can Pressure Companies to Take Sustainability Seriously. George Serafeim, June 23, 2019, Paper, “Climate change and other environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues are not political or partisan topics, and not limited to niche investors. Measuring and analyzing ESG information is becoming an important activity for any investor who seeks to optimize risk and return —a growing body of evidence shows that companies with strong ESG policies produce better financial results. Academic research analyzing 2,000 U.S. companies from 1993 to 2014 shows higher profit margins and superior risk-adjusted returns for those that made significant ESG investments to improve their performance on industry-specific material ESG…Link

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For International Cap-and-Trade in Carbon Permits, Price Stabilization Introduces Secondary Free-Rider-Type Problems

For International Cap-and-Trade in Carbon Permits, Price Stabilization Introduces Secondary Free-Rider-Type Problems. Martin Weitzman, June 7, 2019, Paper, “In this brief note (Without holding them responsible for errors, omissions, or interpretations, I am grateful for constructive comments on an earlier version of this note by Joseph Aldy, Severin Borenstein, Maureen Cropper, Carolyn Fischer, Meredith Fowlie, Lawrence Goulder, Geoffrey Heal, N. Gregory Mankiw, Michael Mehling, Gilbert Metcalf, Adele Morris, Ian Parry, William Pizer, Simon Quemin, Andrew Schein, Richard Schmalensee, E. Somanathan, Robert Stavins, David Victor, and Gernot Wagner.), I take the initial allocation of carbon emissions as a prototype international public goods problem. Overcoming the free-rider problem in carbon emissions is central to a successful comprehensive international climate-change agreement. Volunteerism alone may go part way, but is unlikely to fully adequately overcome this free-rider problem. (The numerical values of the pledged “Nationally Determined Contributions” under the Paris Agreement are voluntary, although the Paris Agreement itself may help constructively by laying a legal foundation for participation, reporting, verification, transparency, and trust.)Link

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International Commitments and Domestic Opinion: The Effect of the Paris Agreement on Public Support for Policies to Address Climate Change

International Commitments and Domestic Opinion: The Effect of the Paris Agreement on Public Support for Policies to Address Climate Change. Dustin Tingley, January 2019, Paper, “The Paris Agreement marked a new turn in international environmental agreements, by allowing each country to set its own non-binding goals for emissions reductions. How might purely voluntary international commitments affect domestic support for costly policies to address climate change? We investigated this question by administering survey experiments in the U.S. Our experiments supported three conclusions. First, even voluntary international commitments transformed public opinion. Public support emissions control policies was much higher in scenarios where the U.S. government had joined the Paris Agreement than in scenarios where it had not. Second, voluntary commitments were most consequential in boosting support for policies that imposed intermediate costs on the public, while having smaller effects on policies involving low or high costs. Finally, our experiments exposed the dangers of promising too much (overpledging) or too little (underpledging). These findings have important implications for the design and consequences of international agreements.Link

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