Found 65 article(s) for author 'Cass Sunstein'

The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law

The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, July 16, 2015, Paper. “In the early twenty-first century, public law is being challenged by a fundamental assault on the legitimacy of the administrative state, under the banner of “the separation of powers.” The challengers frequently refer to the specter of Stuart despotism, and they valorize a (putatively) heroic opponent of Stuart despotism: the common-law judge, symbolized by Edward Coke. The New Coke is a shorthand for a cluster of impulses stemming from a belief in the illegitimacy of the modern administrative state. Despite its historical guise, the New Coke is a living-constitutionalist movement, a product of thoroughly contemporary values and fears — perhaps prompted by continuing rejection, in some quarters, of the New Deal itself, and perhaps prompted by a reaction by some of the Justices to controversial initiatives from more recent presidents.Link

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Regulation that asks the Right Questions

Regulation that asks the Right Questions. Cass Sunstein, July 2015, Opinion. “The OIRA administrator is often described as the nation’s “regulatory Czar.” That is a wild overstatement. The president leads the executive branch, and the United States has no Czars (really). But the term does give a clue to the influence and range of the office. OIRA is the cockpit of the regulatory state. The office oversees federal regulations involving clean air and water, food safety, financial stability, national security, health care, energy, agriculture, workplace safety, sex and race discrimination, highway safety, immigration, education, crime…Link

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Nudges, Agency, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics

Nudges, Agency, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics. Cass Sunstein, May 21, 2015, Paper. “This essay has three general themes. The first involves the claim that nudging threatens human agency. My basic response is that human agency is fully retained (because nudges do not compromise freedom of choice) and that agency is always exercised in the context of some kind of choice architecture. The second theme involves the importance of having a sufficiently capacious sense of the category of nudges, and a full appreciation of the differences among them. Some nudges either enlist or combat behavioral biases but others do not…” Link

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Nudges Do Not Undermine Human Agency

Nudges Do Not Undermine Human Agency. Cass R. Sunstein, May 14, 2015, Paper. “Some people believe that nudges undermine human agency, but with appropriate nudges, neither agency nor consumer freedom is at risk. On the contrary, nudges can promote both goals. In some contexts, they are indispensable. There is no opposition between education on the one hand and nudges on the other. Many nudges are educative. Even when they are not, they can complement, and not displace, consumer education...” Link

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COUNTERPOINT TO SIX POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST “REGULATING INTERNALITIES”

Counterpoint to Six Potential Arguments Against “Regulating Externalities”. Cass R. Sunstein, May 13, 2015, Paper. “Here we consider six potential counter-arguments to our paper, “Regulating Internalities.” This is a general rebuttal, not a specific counter-argument against Dudley and Mannix (2015), which appears in this same edition; but we believe that the arguments that we rebut include the major claims set out in that paper...” Link

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Endless options can be exhausting. We need to know when choice matters

Endless options can be exhausting. We need to know when choice matters. Cass Sunstein, March 28, 2015, Opinion. “All over the world, taxis have installed credit card touchscreens, which makes three possible tips visible and simple for customers to select with a quick “touch”. In New York City, the suggested amounts are usually 20%, 25% or 30%. People are free to give a larger tip, a smaller tip or no tip at all, but it is easiest just to touch one of the three conspicuous options. What are the effects of the suggested numbers? The economists Kareem Haggag and Giovanni Paci compiled data on more than 13m New York taxi rides. They found that the touchscreen has led to a significant increase in tips – by an average of more than 10%...” Link

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Nudges, Agency, Navigability, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics

Nudges, Agency, Navigability, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics. Cass Sunstein, March 23, 2015, Paper, “This essay, for a special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology, responds to ten papers that explore the uses and limits of nudges and choice architecture. The essay has three general themes. The first involves the objection that nudging threatens human agency. My basic response is that human agency is fully retained (because nudges do not compromise freedom of choice) and that agency is always exercised in the context of some kind of choice architecture.Link

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Regulation As Delegation

Regulation As Delegation, Cass R. Sunstein, Oren Bar-Gill, February 25, 2015, Paper. “In diverse areas – from retirement savings, to fuel economy, to prescription drugs, to consumer credit, to food and beverage consumption – government makes personal decisions for us or helps us make what it sees as better decisions. In other words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory (BPAT), a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Regulation as Delegation offers a new perspective on familiar objections to apparently paternalistic acts on government’s part, and suggests important distinctions…” Link

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Regulating Internalities

Regulating Internalities. Cass Sunstein, February 2015, Paper. “This paper offers a framework for regulating internalities. Using a simple economic model, we provide four principles for designing and evaluating behaviorally-motivated policy. We then outline rules for determining which contexts reliably reflect true preferences and discuss empirical strategies for measuring internalities. As a case study, we focus on energy efficiency policy, including Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and appliance and lighting energy efficiency standards.Link

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Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis

Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Cass Sunstein, January 22, 2015, Paper. “Cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a way for agencies to ensure that their decisions are informed—that they are based on knowledge about likely consequences, rather than on dogmas, intuitions, hunches, or interest-group pressures. But when agencies lack that knowledge, and cannot obtain it, cost benefit analysis runs into an evident objection. It is tempting to think that financial regulation in particular should not be subjected to cost-benefit analysis, because the problem of insufficient knowledge is pervasive in…” Link

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