Found 26 article(s) for author 'Banking'

The next financial crisis may come soon – are we all that safe?

The next financial crisis may come soon – are we all that safe? Kenneth Rogoff, February 5, 2019, Opinion, “A decade on from the 2008 global financial crisis, policymakers constantly assure us that the system is much safer today. The giant banks at the core of the meltdown have scaled back their risky bets, and everyone – investors, consumers, and central bankers – is still on high alert. Regulators have worked hard to ensure greater transparency and accountability in the banking industry. But are we really all that safe?Link

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Negative Nominal Interest Rates and the Bank Lending Channel

Negative Nominal Interest Rates and the Bank Lending Channel. Lawrence Summers, January 2019, Paper, “Following the crisis of 2008, several central banks engaged in a new experiment by setting negative policy rates. Using aggregate and bank level data, we document that deposit rates stopped responding to policy rates once they went negative and that bank lending rates in some cases increased rather than decreased in response to policy rate cuts. Based on the empirical evidence, we construct a macro-model with a banking sector that links together policy rates, deposit rates and lending rates. Once the policy rate turns negative, the usual transmission mechanism of monetary policy through the bank sector breaks down. Moreover, because a negative policy rate reduces bank profits, the total effect on aggregate output can be contractionary. A calibration which matches Swedish bank level data suggests that a policy rate of -0.50 percent increases borrowing rates by 15 basis points and reduces output by 7 basis points.Link

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An Experimental Test of the Association Between Network Centrality and Cross-Village Risk-Sharing Links

An Experimental Test of the Association Between Network Centrality and Cross-Village Risk-Sharing Links. Rohini Pande, August 14, 2018, Paper, “We test a prediction from a recent paper by Ambrus and Elliott (2018), according to which less volatile incomes increases the association between within community centrality of a household, defined as Myerson centrality, and the probability of keeping financial connections with households outside the village. We use data from a unique field experiment in 185 Indian villages in which a randomly chosen half of the villages got access to formal banking services. We find empirical support for the prediction, as the relationship between Myerson centrality and having outside links is significantly more positive in villages that got access to formal banking.Link 

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As Congress Rolls Back Banking Regulations, One Historian Urges Caution

As Congress Rolls Back Banking Regulations, One Historian Urges Caution. Nancy Koehn, May 29, 2018, Audio, “This month, Congress approved changes to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, a series of banking reforms passed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to stabilize the nation’s economy.  The rollback is limited, applying only to midsize and regional banks. Restrictions on the country’s largest banks are still in place. However, Harvard Business School historian Nancy Koehn cautioned against deregulating the industries responsible for the 2008 crisis too quickly.Link

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Andrei Shleifer at the Ratio Institute

Andrei Shleifer at the Ratio Institute. Andrei Shleifer, May 28, 2018, Video, “Andrei Shleifer is a Professor of Economics at Harvard University. On May 28th he gave a lecture in memory of Eli F. Heckscher at Stockholm School of Economics by invitation from EHFF and the Ratio Institute. In this Ratio dialogue with Ratio CEO Nils Karlson he discusses the Heckscher lecture 2018: ‘A Crisis of Beliefs: Investor Psychology and Financial Fragility’Link

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Issuer Default Risk and Rating Agency Conflicts

Issuer Default Risk and Rating Agency Conflicts. Anywhere Sikochi, April 2018, Paper, “This study examines whether rating agencies assign more stringent and accurate rating adjustments for issuers with higher default risk and whether this leads to adjustments that are more relevant to financial markets. We expect that rating agencies will make more informative subjective adjustments to limit their reputational risk for issuers with a higher likelihood of default—an event that can reveal the quality of assigned ratings. For defaulting issuers, especially those with a higher pre-failure default risk, we find that adjustments grow more stringent and accurate in the months leading up to default and better predict lender default recovery rates.Link

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Making Sense of Soft Information: Interpretation Bias and Loan Quality

Making Sense of Soft Information: Interpretation Bias and Loan Quality. Dennis Campbell, April 2018, Paper, “We explore whether behavioral biases impede the effective processing and interpretation of soft information in private lending. Taking advantage of the internal reporting system of a large federal credit union, we delineate three important biases likely to affect the lending process: (1) limited attention (or distraction), (2) task-specific human capital, and (3) common identity. Specifically, we find that using soft information in lending decisions leads to worse loan quality when loan officers are busy or before weekends and around national holidays; when loan officers had earlier sales experience; and when both officers and borrowers are men. Overall, we provide novel evidence of non-agency-related costs in the use of soft information in lending decisions.Link

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In Defense of Economic Populism

In Defense of Economic Populism. Dani Rodrik, January 9, 2018, Opinion, “Populists’ aversion to institutional restraints extends to the economy, where they oppose obstacles placed in their way by autonomous regulatory agencies, independent central banks, and global trade rules. But while populism in the political domain is almost always harmful, economic populism can sometimes be justified.Link

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Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly

Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly. Mark Roe, November 20, 2017, Paper, “At the root of recurring bank crises are deeply-implanted incentives for banks and their executives to take systemically excessive risk. Since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, regulators have sought to strengthen the financial system by requiring more capital (which can absorb losses from risk-taking) and less risk-taking, principally via command-and-control rules. Yet bankers’ baseline incentives for system-degrading risk-taking remain intact.Link

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