Found 5 article(s) for author 'Yiling Chen'

Fairness at Equilibrium in the Labor Market

Fairness at Equilibrium in the Labor Market. Yiling Chen, July 5, 2017, Paper, “Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single definition, we seek to resolve both within the particular domain of employment discrimination. To this end, we construct a dual labor market model composed of a Temporary Labor Market, in which €rm strategies are constrained to ensure group-level fairness, and a Permanent Labor Market, in which individual worker fairness is guaranteed.Link

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Learning to Incentivize: Eliciting Effort via Output Agreement

Learning to Incentivize: Eliciting Effort via Output Agreement. Yang Liu, Yiling Chen, April 19, 2016, Paper. “In crowdsourcing when there is a lack of verification for contributed answers, output agreement mechanisms are often used to incentivize participants to provide truthful answers when the correct answer is hold by the majority. In this paper, we focus on using output agreement mechanisms to elicit effort, in addition to eliciting truthful answers, from a population of workers. We consider a setting where workers have heterogeneous cost of effort exertion and examine the data requester’s problem of deciding the reward level in output agreement for optimal elicitation. In particular, when the requester knows the cost distribution, we derive the optimal reward level for output agreement mechanisms.” Link

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Market Manipulation with Outside Incentives

Market Manipulation with Outside Incentives. Yiling Chen, March 1, 2014, Paper. “Much evidence has shown that prediction markets can effectively aggregate dispersed information about uncertain future events and produce remarkably accurate forecasts. However, if the market prediction will be used for decision making, a strategic participant with a vested interest in the decision outcome may manipulate the market prediction to influence the resulting decision. The presence of such incentives outside of the market would seem to damage the market’s ability to aggregate information because…” Link Verified October 11, 2014

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The Effects of Performance-Contingent Financial Incentives in Online Labor Markets

The Effects of Performance-Contingent Financial Incentives in Online Labor Markets. Yiling Chen, July 2013, Paper. “Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) have emerged as platforms that facilitate the allocation of productive effort across global economies. Many of these markets compensate workers with monetary payments. We study the effects of performance-contingent financial rewards on work quality and worker effort in MTurk via two experiments. We find that…” Link Verified October 11, 2014

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What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets

What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets. Yiling Chen, June 2013, Paper. “The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future event of interest. How well this goal is achieved depends on the behavior of self-interested market participants, which are crucially influenced by not only their private information but also their knowledge of others’ private information, in other words, the information structure of market participants…” May require purchase or user account. Link Verified October 11, 2014

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