Found 5 article(s) for author 'Takeovers'

Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom

Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom. Mark Roe, March 14, 2014, Paper. “A long-held view in corporate circles has been that furious rapid trading in stock markets has been increasing in recent decades, justifying corporate governance and corporate law measures that would further shield managers and boards from shareholder influence, to further free boards and managers to pursue their view of sensible long-term strategies in their investment and management policies. Here, I evaluate the evidence in favor of that view…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill

Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill. Lucian Bebchuk, March 1, 2014, Paper. “We argue that the state-law rules governing poison pills are vulnerable to challenges based on preemption by the Williams Act. Such challenges, we show, could well have a major impact on the corporate-law landscape…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value

The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value. Lucian Bebchuk, September 2013, Paper. “According to an influential view in corporate law writings and debates, pressure from shareholders leads companies to take myopic actions that are costly in the long term, and insulating boards from such pressure serves the long-term interests of companies as well as their shareholders. This board insulation claim has been regularly invoked in a wide range of contexts to support existing or tighter limits on shareholder rights and involvement. This paper subjects this view to a comprehensive examination and finds it wanting…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. Lucian Bebchuk, July 9, 2013, Paper. “We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance – the claim that interventions by activist shareholders, and in particular activist hedge funds, have an adverse effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. While this “myopic activists” claim has been regularly invoked and has had considerable influence, its supporters have thus far failed to back it up with evidence…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy

Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy. Lucian Bebchuk, April 2013, Paper. “The SEC is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the Commission shorten the ten-day window, established by Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, within which investors must publicly disclose purchases of a 5% or greater stake in public companies. In this Article, we provide the first systematic empirical evidence on these disclosures and find that several of the petition’s factual premises are not consistent with the evidence.Our analysis is based on about 2,000 filings by activist hedge funds…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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