Found 45 article(s) for author 'Rohini Pande'

Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India

Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India. Rohini Pande, May 2, 2013, Paper. “In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This paper reports on a two- year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although true emissions were typically higher…” Link

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What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-party Auditors.

What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-party Auditors. Rohini Pande, May 2013, Paper. “We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India

Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India. Rohini Pande, 2013, Paper. “In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India

Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India, Rohini Pande, January 2013, Paper, “Do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high-return but illiquid business oppor- tunities among the poor? Using a field experiment, we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two-month grace period. The provision of a grace period increased short-run business investment and long-run profits but also default rates. The results, thus, indicate that debt contracts that require early re- payment discourage illiquid risky investment and thereby limit the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty.” Link

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Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India, Rohini Pande, December 19, 2012, Paper, What factors determine the nature of political opportunism in local govern- ment in South-India? To answer this question, we study two types of policy decision that have been delegated to local politicians – beneficiary selection for transfer programs and the allocation of within-village public goods. Our data on village councils in South-India show that, relative to other citizens, elected councillors are more likely to be selected as beneficiaries of a large transfer program. The chief councillor’s village also obtains more public goods, rela- tive to other villages. These findings can be interpreted using a simple model of the logic of political incentives in the context that we study. Link

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Repayment Flexibility Can Reduce Financial Stress: A Randomized Control Trial with Microfinance Clients in India

Repayment Flexibility Can Reduce Financial Stress: A Randomized Control Trial with Microfinance Clients in India, Rohini Pande, September 26, 2012, Paper, “Financial stress is widely believed to cause health problems. However, policies seeking to relieve financial stress by limiting debt levels of poor households may directly worsen their economic well-being. We evaluate an alternative policy – increasing the repayment flexibility of debt contracts. A field experiment randomly assigned microfinance clients to a monthly or a traditional weekly installment schedule (N=200). We used cell phones to gather survey data on income, expenditure, and financial stress every 48 hours over seven weeks.”  Link

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Introduction to Issue on Malnutrition

Introduction to Issue on Malnutrition. Rohini Pande, April 26, 2012, Paper. ““In poor countries, over a quarter of children under the age of five years are malnourished. The corresponding rate in rich countries is below 3%. Unfortunately, being undernourished as a child is associated with worse economic outcomes as an adult, largely a result of worse adult health. Thus, malnutrition among children creates one of the starkest discrepancies in individual well-being between rich and poor countries. Yet, income growth does not seem to be the solution per se. Despite rapid economic growth in the past 20 years, South Asia, for example, continues to have inordinately high levels of undernourished children.” Link

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Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India

Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India. Rohini Pande, January 25, 2012, Paper. “Exploiting a randomized natural experiment in India, we show that female leadership influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment. A 1993 law reserved leadership positions for women in randomly selected village councils. Using 8,453 surveys of adolescents aged 11-15 and their parents in 495 villages, we find that, compared to villages that were never reserved, the gender gap in aspirations closed by 25% in parents and 32% in adolescents in villages assigned to a female leader for two election cycles…” Link

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Corruption in Developing Countries

Corruption in Developing Countries. Rohini Pande, August 2011, Paper. “Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists’ ability to measure corruption. This, in turn, has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption. We find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory, but also that effects of anti-corruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate strategies to pursue rents.” Link

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Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low Income Democracies

Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low Income Democracies: Rohini Pande, January 2011: Paper: “This article evaluates a body of recent work which uses field and natural experiments to answer this question. A common finding in the literature is that voter behavior is malleable and that in- formation about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. Limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractices in low-income democracies…” Link

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