Found 19 article(s) for author 'Lucian Bebchuk'

Toward Board Declassification in 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 Companies: Report of the SRP for the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons

Toward Board Declassification in 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 Companies: Report of the SRP for the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons. Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst, June Rhee, February 1, 2014, Paper. “This report provides an overview and analysis of the work that the Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) undertook on behalf of a number of institutional investors during 2012 and 2013, the SRP’s first two years of operations. During 2012 and 2013, the SRP worked on behalf of eight SRP-represented investors on board declassification proposals…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Towards Board Declassification at 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 Companies: Advancing Annual Elections in the 2014 Proxy Season

Towards Board Declassification at 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 Companies: Advancing Annual Elections in the 2014 Proxy Season. Lucian Bebchuk, December 12, 2013, Opinion. “In a news alert released last week, the Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) announced the work that SRP-represented investors and the SRP are undertaking for the 2014 proxy season, and the significant contribution that this work is expected to make in moving 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies towards annual elections. 31 shareholder proposals for board declassification have been submitted to S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies for a vote at their 2014…” Link verified April 3, 2014

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The SEC Delays its Consideration of Rules Requiring Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending

The SEC Delays its Consideration of Rules Requiring Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending. Lucian Bebchuk, December 2, 2013, Opinion. “Last week the Securities and Exchange Commission released its regulatory agenda, and this agenda no longer includes rules requiring public companies to disclose their spending on politics. The agenda now includes only overdue rules that the SEC is required to develop under Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act. While we are disappointed by the SEC’s decision to delay its consideration of rules requiring disclosure of corporate political spending, we hope that the SEC will consider such rules as soon…” Link verified April 3, 2014

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Don’t Run Away from the Evidence: A Reply to Wachtell Lipton

Don’t Run Away from the Evidence: A Reply to Wachtell Lipton. Lucian Bebchuk, September 17, 2013, Opinion. “In two recent memoranda by the law firm of Wachtell Lipton (Wachtell), The Bebchuk Syllogism (Syllogism memo) and Current Thoughts about Activism (Current Thoughts memo), the firm’s founder Martin Lipton and several other senior Wachtell lawyers strongly criticize our recent study, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. Our study empirically disproves the myopic activists claim that interventions by activist hedge funds are in the long term detrimental to the involved companies and their long-term shareholders…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value

The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value. Lucian Bebchuk, September 2013, Paper. “According to an influential view in corporate law writings and debates, pressure from shareholders leads companies to take myopic actions that are costly in the long term, and insulating boards from such pressure serves the long-term interests of companies as well as their shareholders. This board insulation claim has been regularly invoked in a wide range of contexts to support existing or tighter limits on shareholder rights and involvement. This paper subjects this view to a comprehensive examination and finds it wanting…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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The Myth of Hedge Funds as ‘Myopic Activists’

The Myth of Hedge Funds as ‘Myopic Activists’. Lucian Bebchuk, August 6, 2013, Opinion. “The recent increase in hedge-fund activism aimed at producing changes in business strategy or leadership—including at large companies such as Apple, Hess, Procter & Gamble and, as announced last week, Air Products—has met intense opposition from public companies and their advisers. Opponents, such as prominent corporate adviser Martin Lipton, argue that such activism is detrimental to the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. Lucian Bebchuk, July 9, 2013, Paper. “We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance – the claim that interventions by activist shareholders, and in particular activist hedge funds, have an adverse effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. While this “myopic activists” claim has been regularly invoked and has had considerable influence, its supporters have thus far failed to back it up with evidence…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending

Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending. Lucian Bebchuk, April 2013, Paper. “The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently considering a rule making petition requesting that the SEC develop rules requiring that public companies disclose their spending on politics. The petition, which was submitted by a committee of ten corporate law professors that we co-chaired, has received unprecedented support, including comment letters from nearly half a million individuals. At the same time, the petition has also attracted opponents, including prominent members of Congress…”  Link verified April 2013

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Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy

Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy. Lucian Bebchuk, April 2013, Paper. “The SEC is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the Commission shorten the ten-day window, established by Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, within which investors must publicly disclose purchases of a 5% or greater stake in public companies. In this Article, we provide the first systematic empirical evidence on these disclosures and find that several of the petition’s factual premises are not consistent with the evidence.Our analysis is based on about 2,000 filings by activist hedge funds…” Link verified June 19, 2014

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