Found 15 article(s) for author 'Joseph Aldy'

The Political Economy of Carbon Pricing Policy Design

The Political Economy of Carbon Pricing Policy Design. Joseph Aldy, October 2017, Paper, “The goal of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, which was established in 2007, is to identify and advance scientifically sound, economically sensible, and politically pragmatic public policy options for addressing global climate change. Drawing upon leading thinkers from around the world, the Project conducts research on policy architecture, key design elements, and institutional dimensions of international and domestic climate-change policy. The Project is directed by Robert N. Stavins, A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School. For more information, see the Project’s website…Link

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Energy Market Shock Absorbers: Waiving Environmental Regulations in Response to Fuel Market Disruptions

Energy Market Shock Absorbers: Waiving Environmental Regulations in Response to Fuel Market Disruptions. Joseph Aldy, March 23, 2017, Paper, “As a result, such volatility can have important political implications. Energy price volatility has historically reflected geopolitical events around the world. But recently in the United States, natural disasters, policy design and implementation, and competition in markets have contributed to volatility in U.S. energy price.Link

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Regulations have costs, benefits

Regulations have costs, benefits. Joseph Aldy, February 16, 2017, Opinion, “President Trump jettisoned more than 30 years of bipartisan regulatory policy on January 30 when he issued an executive order on “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.” The order requires that whenever a new regulation is enacted by any federal agency, regulators must eliminate two rules so that the cost of complying with the new rule is offset by the costs associated with the two existing rules. But Trump misses a crucial point about government regulations: They impose costs on society, but they also produce benefits.Link

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Economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the Paris Agreement

Economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the Paris Agreement. Joseph Aldy, 2016, Paper, “The Paris Agreement culminates a six-year transition toward an international climate policy architecture based on parties submitting national pledges every five years. An important policy task will be to assess and compare these contributions. We use four integrated assessment models to produce metrics of Paris Agreement pledges, and show differentiated effort across countries: wealthier countries pledge to undertake greater emission reductions with higher costs. The pledges fall in the lower end of the distributions of the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the cost-minimizing path to limiting warming to 2â °C, suggesting insufficient global ambition in light of leaders’ climate goals. Countries’ marginal abatement costs vary by two orders of magnitude, illustrating that large efficiency gains are available through joint mitigation efforts and/or carbon price coordination.Link

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Transparency, Policy Surveillance, and the Comparison of Mitigation Efforts

Transparency, Policy Surveillance, and the Comparison of Mitigation Efforts. Joseph Aldy, November 2016, Paper, “This paper synthesizes the work in a research program focused on the transparency and comparability of mitigation efforts in multilateral climate change policy. We take as our starting point the emerging international architecture, which creates demand for practical mechanisms to compare domestic efforts to mitigate global climate change. How do countries decide whether and to what degree pledges by their peers—often expressed in different forms that stymie obvious apples-to-apples comparison—are sufficient to justify their own actions now and more ambitious actions in the future? We describe a number of desirable features of metrics that might be used for ex ante comparisons of proposed pledges and ex post assessments of subsequent actions delivering on those pledges.Link

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Long-term Carbon Policy: The Great Swap

Long-term Carbon Policy: The Great Swap. Joseph Aldy, November 2016, Paper, “In the past two decdes, the mounting risks posed by climate change have motivated businesses, cities, states, national governments, and the international community to pledge to take action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Given the scale of the problem, the breadth of action must be effective and must set the foundation for increasing mitigation efforts over time. Thus, delivering on these pledges will require effective policies to drive the deployment of low-carbon technologies today and technological innovation in the future to ramp ambition up on par with the risks of climate change.Link

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Political economy of Clinton’s ambitious energy program

Political economy of Clinton’s ambitious energy program. Joseph Aldy, 2016, Opinion, “Hillary Clinton’s campaign has stressed her continuity with Obama’s energy policy on key aspects such as decarbonization of the US economy, technological innovation and global cooperation. However, policy reforms to deliver long-term climate goals might be out of reach in a highly divided Congress.” Link

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Capital versus Output Subsidies: Implications of Alternative Incentives for Wind Energy

Capital versus Output Subsidies: Implications of Alternative Incentives for Wind Energy. Joseph Aldy, September 2016, Paper “We examine the choice between using capital and using output subsidies to promote wind energy in the United States. We exploit a natural experiment in which wind farm developers were unexpectedly given the opportunity to choose between an upfront investment subsidy and an output subsidy in order to estimate the differential impact of these subsidies on project productivity. Using matching and instrumental variables, we find that wind farms choosing the capital subsidy produce 5 to 12 percent less electricity per unit of capacity than wind farms selecting the output subsidy and that this effect is driven by incentives generated by these subsidies rather than selection. We then use these estimates to evaluate the public economics of U.S. wind energy subsidies. Link

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Alternative Metrics for Comparing Domestic Climate Change Mitigation Efforts and the Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture

Alternative Metrics for Comparing Domestic Climate Change Mitigation Efforts and the Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture. Joseph Aldy, August 4, 2015, Paper. “The availability of practical mechanisms for comparing domestic efforts aimed at mitigating global climate change are important for the stability, equity, and efficiency of international climate agreements. We examine a variety of metrics that could be used to compare countries’ climate change mitigation efforts and illustrate their potential application to large developed and developing countries. Because there is no single comprehensive, measurable metric that could be applied…” Link

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Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy

Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy. Joseph Aldy, June 8, 2015, Paper. “Inadequate policy surveillance has undermined the effectiveness of multilateral climate agreements. To illustrate an alternative approach to transparency, I evaluate policy surveillance under the 2009 G-20 fossil fuel subsidies agreement. The Leaders of the Group of 20 nations tasked their energy and finance ministers to identify and phase-out fossil fuel subsidies. The G-20 leaders agreed to submit their subsidy reform strategies to peer review and to independent expert review conducted by international…Link

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