Found 6 article(s) for author 'Business ethics'

Swinging between Moral and Market Imperatives

Swinging between Moral and Market Imperatives. Julie Battilana, 2017, Paper, “Financial institutions with religious affiliations are active participants in the financial market, engaging in various risky financial behaviors, yet existing studies of religion and risk preferences yield inconsistent findings. Informed by institutional theory, we argue that moral imperatives are foundational for religious organizations’ identity; as such, the nature of the risky financial behaviors in which religious financial institutions engage matters. By examining religious credit unions’ engagement in the risky financial product- private- label mortgage-backed security (PMBS), we argue that religious credit unions shun financial products associated with deception, greed, and excessive value extractions that clash with the core moral principles of probity, justice, and trust that are fundamental to religious identity.Link

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What Corporate Bankruptcy Can Teach Us About Morality

What Corporate Bankruptcy Can Teach Us About Morality. Mihir Desai, June 27, 2017, Audio, “Does the world of finance and markets needs a good infusion of humanity? One book examines how how a wider reading of the humanities can help you understand finance and — at the same time — how finance can help you understand the human condition. It’s by economist and Harvard Business School Professor Mihir Desai.  He joined Marketplace Morning Report host David Brancaccio to discuss his latest book, “The Wisdom of Finance: Discovering Humanity in the World of Risk and Return.”Link


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The Responsibilities and Role of Business in Relation to Society: Back to Basics?

The Responsibilities and Role of Business in Relation to Society: Back to Basics? Nien-hê Hsieh, April 11, 2017, Paper, “In this address, I outline a “back to basics” approach to specifying the responsibilities and role of business in relation to society. Three “basics” comprise the approach. The first is arguing that basic principles of ordinary morality, such as a duty not to harm, provide an adequate basis for specifying the responsibilities of business managers. The second is framing the role of business in society by looking to the values realized by the basic building blocks of contemporary economic activity, i.e., markets and firms. The third is making explicit the basic institutions that structure the background against which business operates. The aim is to develop a plausible framework for managerial decision making that respects the fact of value pluralism in a global economy and that fosters meaningful criticism of current business practices while remaining sufficiently grounded in contemporary circumstances so as to be relevant for managers. Link

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Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals

Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals. John Coates, October 26, 2016, Paper, “Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size – from 35 to 88 singlespaced pages in this paper’s font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity – from post-graduate “grade 20” to post-doctoral “grade 30”. A substantial portion (lower bound ~20%) of the growth consists not of mere verbiage but of substantive new terms. These include rational reactions to new legal risks (e.g., SOX, FCPA enforcement, shareholder litigation) as well as to changes in deal and financing markets (e.g., financing conditions, financing covenants, and cooperation covenants; and reverse termination fees).Link

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Empowering Minority Shareholders and Executive Compensation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Empowering Minority Shareholders and Executive Compensation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Jesse Fried, August 2016, Paper, “We use a recent regulatory change in Israel to examine the efficacy of minority shareholder approval. In 2011, the level of minority shareholder support required for approving related party transactions, including executive compensation paid to controlling shareholders or to their relatives, increased from a third to a majority of the minority votes cast, and a new rule required renewal of this approval every three years. Comparing changes in compensation following approvals before and after the reform, we find that only the new type of approval constrains compensation, and that this effect is present only when the firm does not choose the timing of the vote.Link

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