Found 37 article(s) for author 'Andrei Shleifer'

Beliefs about Gender

Beliefs about Gender. Andrei Shleifer, December 2016, Paper, “We conduct a laboratory experiment on the determinants of beliefs about own and others’ ability across different domains. A preliminary look at the data points to two distinct forces: miscalibration in estimating performance depending on the difficulty of tasks and gender stereotypes. We develop a theoretical model that separates these forces and apply it to analyze a large laboratory dataset in which participants estimate their own and a partner’s performance on questions across six subjects: arts and literature, emotion recognition, business, verbal reasoning, mathematics, and sports.Link

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Bubbles for Fama

Bubbles for Fama. Robin Greenwood, Andrei Shleifer, November 2016, Paper, “We evaluate Eugene Fama’s claim that stock prices do not exhibit price bubbles. Based on US industry returns 1926-2014 and international sector returns 1986-2014, we present four findings: (1) Fama is correct in that a sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward; (2) such sharp price increases do predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash; (3) attributes of the price run-up, including volatility, issuance, book-to-market ratio, market P/E ratio and the price path of the run-up can all help forecast an eventual crash; and (4) some of these characteristics can help investors earn superior returns by timing the bubble. Results hold similarly in US and international samples.Link

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A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics

A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics. Edward Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, October 2016, Paper, “Chinese housing prices rose by over 10 percent per year in real terms between 2003 and 2014, and are now between two and ten times higher than the construction cost of apartments. At the same time, Chinese developers built 100 billion square feet of residential real estate. This boom has been accompanied by a large increase in the number of vacant homes, held by both developers and households. This boom may turn out to be a housing bubble followed by a crash, yet that future is far from certain. The demand for real estate in China is so strong that current prices might be sustainable, especially given the sparse alternative investments for Chinese households, so long as the level of new supply is radically curtailed.Link

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Securing Property Rights

Securing Property Rights. Edward Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, September 2016, Paper, “A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak. We present evidence that the less educated and poorer citizens in many countries feel their property rights are least secure. We then present a model of a farmer and a mine which can pollute his farm in a jurisdiction where the mine can subvert law enforcement. We show that, in this model, injunctions or other forms of property rules work better than compensation for damage or liability rules. The equivalences of the Coase Theorem break down in realistic ways. The case for injunctions is even stronger when parties can invest in power. Our approach sheds light on several controversies in law and economics, but also applies to practical problems in developing countries, such as low demand for formality, law enforcement under uncertain property rights, and unresolved conflicts between environmental damage and development.Link

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Expectations and investment

Expectations and investment. Andrei Shleifer, May 2016, Paper. “Using micro data from the Duke University quarterly survey of Chief Financial Officers, we show that corporate investment plans as well as actual investment are well explained by CFOs’ expectations of earnings growth. The information in expectations data is not subsumed by traditional variables, such as Tobin’s Q or discount rates. We also show that errors in CFO expectations of earnings growth are predictable from past earnings and other data, pointing to the extrapolative structure of expectations and suggesting that expectations may not be rational. This evidence, like earlier findings in finance, points to the usefulness of data on actual expectations for understanding economic behaviour.Link 

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Extrapolation and Bubbles

Extrapolation and Bubbles. Robin Greenwood, Andrei Shleifer, January 2016, Paper. “We present an extrapolative model of bubbles. In the model, many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals–an average of the asset’s past price changes and the asset’s degree of overvaluation. The two signals are in conflict, and investors “waver” over time in the relative weight they put on them. The model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles. We analyze the patterns of cash-flow news that generate the largest bubbles, the reasons why bubbles collapse, and the frequency with which they occur.”  Link

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Extrapolation and Bubbles

Extrapolation and Bubbles. Robin Greenwood, Andrei Shleifer, September 2015, Paper, “We present an extrapolative model of bubbles. In the model, many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals—an average of the asset’s past price changes and the asset’s degree of overvaluation. The two signals are in conflict, and investors “waver” over time in the relative weight they put on them. The model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles. We analyze the patterns of cash-flow news that generate the largest bubbles, the reasons why bubbles collapse, and the frequency with which they occur. The model also predicts that bubbles will be accompanied by high trading volume, and that volume increases with past asset returns. We present empirical evidence that bears on some of the model’s distinctive predictions.Link

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Investment Hangover and the Great Recession

Investment Hangover and the Great Recession. Andrei Shleifer, July 1, 2015, Paper. “We present a model of investment hangover motivated by the Great Recession. In our model, overbuilding of residential capital requires a reallocation of productive resources to nonresidential sectors, which is facilitated by a reduction in the real interest rate. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound and nominal rigidities, then the economy enters a liquidity trap with limited reallocation and low output. The drop in output reduces nonresidential investment through a mechanism similar to the acceleration principle of investment…” Link

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Expectations and Investment

Expectations and Investment. Andrei Shleifer, April 2015, Paper. “Using micro data from Duke University quarterly survey of Chief Financial Officers, we show that corporate investment plans as well as actual investment are well explained by CFOs’ expectations of earnings growth. The information in expectations data is not subsumed by traditional variables, such as Tobin’s Q or discount rates. We also show that errors in CFO expectations of earnings growth are predictable from past earnings and other data, pointing to extrapolative structure of expectations and suggesting that expectations may not be rational…” Link

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Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises

Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises, Andrei Shleifer, December 2014, Paper, Financial crises are supposed to be rare events, yet they occur quite often. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), investors suffer from “this time is different” syndrome, failing to see crises coming because they do not recognize similarities among the different pre-crisis bubbles. As a result, each crisis surprises investors. Economists typically model financial crises as responses to shocks to which investors attach a low probability ex ante, but which nonetheless materialize. Such shocks (sometimes referred to as “MIT shocks”; e.g., Caballero and Simsek 2013) are consistent with rational expectations in that investors recognize that there is a small chance that the shock might occur, but they are harder to reconcile with the Reinhart Rogoff observation that crises are not that unusual. Link

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