Found 584 article(s) in category 'Regulation'

The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins

The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins. Andrei Shleifer, 2008, Paper. “In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.” Link

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Sticky Borders

Sticky Borders. Gita Gopinath and Roberto Rigobon, 2008, Paper. “The stickiness and currency of pricing of traded goods play a central role in international macroeconomics; however, empirical evidence on these features is seriously limited. To address this, we use micro data on U.S. import and export prices at the dock for the period 1994–2005 and present four main results: First, the median price duration in the currency of pricing is 10.6 (12.8) months for imports (exports). Second, 90% (97%) of imports (exports) are priced in dollars. Consequently, contrary to standard modeling assumptions…” Link

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Grist: A Strategic Approach to Climate

Grist: A Strategic Approach to Climate. Michael Porter, Forest Reinhardt, October 1, 2007, Paper. “Climate change is now a fact of political life and is playing a growing role in business competition. Greenlouse gas emissions will be increasingly scrutinized, regulated, and priced. While individual managers can disagree about how immediate and significant the impact of climate change will be, companies need to take action now. Companies that persist in treating climate change solely as a corporate social responsibility issue, rather than a business problem, will risk the greatest consequences. Of course, a company’s climate policies…” Link 

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Policy Options for Reducing Oil Consumption and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from the U.S. Transportation Sector

Policy Options for Reducing Oil Consumption and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from the U.S. Transportation Sector. Henry Lee, Summer 2007. Paper.The goal of this discussion paper is to contribute to the current policy debate about how to effectively limit or reduce oil consumption and greenhouse-gas emissions from the U.S. transportation sector. The paper explains what is wrong with the status quo and therefore why new policies are needed. It examines special policy challenges in this domain, and analyzes the pros and cons of individual policy measures. Finally, the paper explores the probable overall effects…” Link

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RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, AND THE PATTERN OF TRADE

RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, AND THE PATTERN OF TRADE. Nathan Nunn, May 2007, Paper. “Is a country’s ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important…” Link

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Toward a Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion

Toward a Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion. William Hogan, April 14, 2007, Paper. “Electricity transmission pricing and transmission grid expansion have received increasing regulatory and analytical attention in recent years. Since electricity transmission is a very special service with unusual characteristics, such as loop flows, the approaches have been largely tailor-made and not simply taken from the general economic literature or from the more specific but still general incentive regulation literature. An exception has been Vogelsang (2001), who postulated transmission…” Link

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Political Economy of Panchayats in South India

Political Economy of Panchayats in South India. Rohini Pande, February 24, 2007, Paper. “Based on a study of some 500 villages in the four southern Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, this paper examines how the functioning of the panchayat system mandated by the 73rd amendment to the Constitution has had an impact on the economic status of villages and the households within them. The study finds that gram panchayats, created by this massive experiment in democratic decentralisation, have had an effect on the delivery of public services, for example…” Link

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Private Credit in 129 Countries

Private Credit in 129 Countries. Andrei Shleifer, January 24, 2007, Paper. “We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary…” Link

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Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?

Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria? Rohini Pande, January 2007, Paper, “Individuals’ inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual’s incomes from investment and non- investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government’s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government’s ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.” Link

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Regulation by Generalization

Regulation by Generalization. Richard Zeckhauser, 2007, Paper, “Both criminal and regulatory laws have traditionally been skeptical of what Jeremy Bentham referred to as evidentiary offenses – the prohibition (or regulation) of some activity not because it is wrong, but because it probabilistically (but not universally) indicates that a real wrong has occurred. From Bentham to the present, courts and theorists have worried about this form of regulation, believing that certainly in the criminal law context, but even with respect to regulation, it is wrong to impose sanctions on a ‘‘Where there’s smoke there’s fire’’ theory of governmental interventionLink

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