Found 573 article(s) in category 'Regulation'

The Integrity of Private Third-Party Compliance Monitoring

The Integrity of Private Third-Party Compliance Monitoring. Michael Toffel, January 5, 2017, Paper, “Government agencies are increasingly turning to private, third-party monitors to inspect and assess regulated entities’ compliance with law, just as companies hire auditors to assess their financial accounts, operations, and supply chains. The integrity of these regimes rests on the validity of the information third-party monitors provide. The challenge in designing third-party monitoring regimes is that for-profit private monitors, typically selected and paid by the firms subject to monitoring, have incentives to downplay problems they observe in order to satisfy and retain their clients or to earn income from selling other services. This paper discusses the most important factors that our research and the research of many others has shown can affect the integrity of third-party monitoring and highlights some policy implications for regulators and companies designing third-party monitoring regimes.Link

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Federal Minerals Leasing Reform and Climate Policy

Federal Minerals Leasing Reform and Climate Policy. James Stock, December 2016, Paper, “Through its minerals leasing program, the U.S. government plays a large role in the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal. This footprint is the largest for coal: 41 percent of U.S. coal is mined under federal leases, and burning this coal accounts for 13 percent of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Currently, producers and consumers of this coal do not bear the full social costs associated with its use. At the same time, the threat of climate change has led the international community, including the United States, to pledge significant reductions in CO2 emissions. Over the past two decades Democratic and Republican administrations have taken steps to reduce U.S. CO2 emissions by reducing use of fossil fuels.Link

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Donald Trump Should Know: This Is What Climate Change Costs Us

Donald Trump Should Know: This Is What Climate Change Costs Us. Cass Sunstein, December 15, 2016, Opinion, “Last week, Donald J. Trump’s transition team sent a startling questionnaire to the Department of Energy. Among other things, the questionnaire asked for the names of all employees and contractors who attended meetings of the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, as well as all emails associated with those meetings, and the department’s “opinion” on the underlying issues — a request it essentially refused.Link

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The Trump Boom?

The Trump Boom? Kenneth Rogoff, December 7, 2016, Opinion, “After years of hibernation, will the US economy rouse itself for a big comeback over the next couple of years? With an incoming Republican administration hell-bent on reflating an economy already near full employment, and with promised trade restrictions driving up the price of import-competing goods, and with central-bank independence likely to come under attack, higher inflation – likely exceeding 3% at times – is a near-certainty. And output growth could surprise as well, possibly reaching 4%, at least temporarily.Link

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Private Banking and Crony Capitalism in Egypt

Private Banking and Crony Capitalism in Egypt. Ishac Diwan, 2016, Paper, “In Egypt, the bulk of bank loans during 2003-2010 went to politically connected firms. At the same time, the banking sector was liberalized increasingly operated around competitive and profit-maximizing principles. A key puzzle that the paper tries to answer is why private banks may lend in preferential ways to politically connected firms (PCFs) in such an environment. Using a rich corporate dataset, we find that politically connected firms did not have higher profitability compared to non-politically connected firms. This suggests that PCFs were perceived to have lower risk. Indeed, we find evidence that this was the case, and that lower risk reflected higher access to bailout guarantees (implicit or explicit), as happened in earlier periods, and/or higher perceived growth opportunities.Link

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Economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the Paris Agreement

Economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the Paris Agreement. Joseph Aldy, 2016, Paper, “The Paris Agreement culminates a six-year transition toward an international climate policy architecture based on parties submitting national pledges every five years. An important policy task will be to assess and compare these contributions. We use four integrated assessment models to produce metrics of Paris Agreement pledges, and show differentiated effort across countries: wealthier countries pledge to undertake greater emission reductions with higher costs. The pledges fall in the lower end of the distributions of the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the cost-minimizing path to limiting warming to 2â °C, suggesting insufficient global ambition in light of leaders’ climate goals. Countries’ marginal abatement costs vary by two orders of magnitude, illustrating that large efficiency gains are available through joint mitigation efforts and/or carbon price coordination.Link

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Transparency, Policy Surveillance, and the Comparison of Mitigation Efforts

Transparency, Policy Surveillance, and the Comparison of Mitigation Efforts. Joseph Aldy, November 2016, Paper, “This paper synthesizes the work in a research program focused on the transparency and comparability of mitigation efforts in multilateral climate change policy. We take as our starting point the emerging international architecture, which creates demand for practical mechanisms to compare domestic efforts to mitigate global climate change. How do countries decide whether and to what degree pledges by their peers—often expressed in different forms that stymie obvious apples-to-apples comparison—are sufficient to justify their own actions now and more ambitious actions in the future? We describe a number of desirable features of metrics that might be used for ex ante comparisons of proposed pledges and ex post assessments of subsequent actions delivering on those pledges.Link

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Long-term Carbon Policy: The Great Swap

Long-term Carbon Policy: The Great Swap. Joseph Aldy, November 2016, Paper, “In the past two decdes, the mounting risks posed by climate change have motivated businesses, cities, states, national governments, and the international community to pledge to take action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Given the scale of the problem, the breadth of action must be effective and must set the foundation for increasing mitigation efforts over time. Thus, delivering on these pledges will require effective policies to drive the deployment of low-carbon technologies today and technological innovation in the future to ramp ambition up on par with the risks of climate change.Link

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Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals

Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals. John Coates, October 26, 2016, Paper, “Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size – from 35 to 88 singlespaced pages in this paper’s font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity – from post-graduate “grade 20” to post-doctoral “grade 30”. A substantial portion (lower bound ~20%) of the growth consists not of mere verbiage but of substantive new terms. These include rational reactions to new legal risks (e.g., SOX, FCPA enforcement, shareholder litigation) as well as to changes in deal and financing markets (e.g., financing conditions, financing covenants, and cooperation covenants; and reverse termination fees).Link

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